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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the lag which occurs between the start of
NASA-sponsored research and the development of new technology. It is
obvious that some lag exists. Technology does not spontaneously result the
moment research commences. The crucial question here is, is there a
common l gestation period for all NASA technology?
Social scientists studying the output of privately financed research
and development have assumed the existence of such a common gestation period
or lag. For example F. M. Scherer's recent work "The Propensity to
Patent »2 tries to correlate R S D expenditures with patent output in
various industries. Scherer compares R b D expenditures made in 1974 to the
patents issued between June 1976 and March 1977. This implies a lag of 18
to 39 months between research expenditures and the patenting of new tech-
nology. If we subtract the average nine months it takes to obtain a
patent, 3 we obtain a 9 to 30 month period between research and patent
application.
1 The word "common" was chosen deliberately. An alternative is "average",
but an average can always be calculated from observations of lag times.
"Common" implies the variance in lag times for different technologies is
small.
2 Presented at the 1980 Allied Science Association Meeting at Denver
Colorado, September S, 1980.
3 This was reported by C. A. Agnew et. al., "A Study of Some of the Effects
of Public R&D on the Private Sectoc, - Princeton, N.J.: Mathtech Inc.,
October 30, 1979.
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This work attempts to measure the lag by correlating measures of R & D
effort with measures of technological output. Such output measures are only
as good as the data on which they are bas ,	data problems are discussed in
some detail below.
The following model will be the focus of our thinking on the relation-
ship between research and the development of new technology.
	
T(k) - f(R(k-m),R(k-m+l),...,R(k-1),R(k))
	 (1)
where T(k) is the technology developed in year k
R(i) is the research effort made in year i
m
	
	 is the number of years after which
research effort does not affect
technological output
Equation 1 suggests that the technology developed in time period k,
T(k), is a function of the research effort, R(.), made in time period K and
in previous time periods k-1, k-2, ... , k-L. The function f(.) generally
can take on any form. For this exercise however, only linear models will
be considered. The relationship as written also suggests that the func-
tional relationship remains constant through time.
This is what the linear model proposes:
T(k) - a + cm R(k-m) + ... + c o
 R(k)	 (2)
i
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AA nonlinear model is more complex than this. However, it allows addi-
tional units of research effort to have different marginal effects. Econo-
tI	 mies of scale therefore can be modeled such that additional research efforts
result in more than proportional increases in technological output. Scherer
teP.r for nonlinearities in his work 4 and finds that statistically signifi-
cant nonlinearities existed in some industries and not in others. The
significant nonlinearities were both positive and negative indicating both
economies and diseconomies of scale.
Scherer's finding of statisically significant departures from the
linear model benefited from an extremely large sample size. There are not
enough data points available for this study to attempt to draw equally
strong conclusions. For example, in a quadratic model, ignoring interaction
effects (i.e. zross-product terms), the number of coefficients which must
be estimated is one less than twice the number to be estimated for the
linear equation. A linear three year lag model requires four coefficients
while the quadratic three year lag model requires seven.
4 Scherer, op. cit.
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2. MEASURING RESEARCH EFFORT AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
a;
Social scientists have always found it difficult to study research and
technology. Kany of their problems have related to data; those wishing to
make statistical inferences about research and technology are forced to
utilize indirect indicators of these quantities. Results and interpreta-
tions of studies using such indicators are questioned by academics and deci-
sion makers alike.
Social scientists commonly use two different indicators of research
effort: 5
 R&D dollars spent and employment of scientists and engineers;
they also comonly use two different indicators of technological output:
invention disclosures reported and patent applications made. Each of these
measures has drawbacks when used to study industrial research and develop-
ment, as discussed in the following subsections.
2.1 R&D DOLLARS
Generally the amount of money spent on R&D is not consistently measured
because accounting practices vary from organization to organization and
through time. In the case of NASA, this is not an important consideration,
unless comparisons are made between NASA and other R&D entities. However,
other problems exist.
From the viewpoint of federal budgeting, NASA is an R&D agency, and
almost every dollar it spends is considered R&D spending. Unfortunately,
5 For example, Solo's and Scherer's work already mentioned.
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much of this money is not spent on research or the development of new tech-
nology. For example, the money NASA spends acquiring launch vehicles is
considered R&D spending. This is the case even though the technology for
making a Centaur or Delta rocket has already been developed, and paid for.
The same is true for the procurement of other technologically advanced
equipment (e.g. computers, tracking devices).
It is possible to look at NASA budgets and roughly separate the money
spent on "true" R&D from the rest. However, exercises of this type result
in expenditure estimates that tend to be proportional to the total NASA
budget- 6 Hence, the resulting expenditure streams should result in statis-
tical predictions that do not differ by more than a proportionality con-
stant.
The work reported here therefore uses total NASA expenditure figures,
rather than picking out research expenditures from the rest. Figure I gives
the history of NASA outlays in constant dollars by calendar year. The
figures were derived from fiscal year data by averaging, and converted to
constant dollars using the GNP price deflator. (The data used for the
figure are given in Appendix A. Its derivation is described in Appendix C.)
6 Unpublished work by Henry Hertzfeld at NASA demonstrates this fact, but it
is not surprising that this should be the case. The budgetary process is
such that it is easier to get congressional approval for budgets that are
proportional to previous budgets than to risk major •-hanges.
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Figure I
NASA R&D OUTLAYS
By Calendar Year in 1972 Dollars
W.
1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980
YEAR
2.2 NASA EMPLOYMENT
As measures of R&D effort employment statistics face criticism because
employees differ in ability, desire and level of interest in their work.
Moreover, individuals counted as scientists and engineers may actually be
management personnel, no longer engaged in research. Records exist on the
number of civil service employees working for NASA through the years,
showing what type of worker they were. However, since NASA contracts with
private firms for most of its research, these numbers do not give a complete
picture. Some recorda are kept on the cumber of people employed by con-
tractors. Unfortunately, these are kept for only a small percentage of
contracts. NASA estimates the employment generated by other contracts from
budget expenditures using a multiplier and price deflator. The resulting
employment figures are definitely not independent of expenditure records.
Even though employment records do not exist for the entire NASA pro-
gram, the in-house employment records are valuable because the number of
NASA employees classified as scientists and engineers provide an indirect
measure of NASA's internal research and development effort. However, this
figure still has the drawbacks that some scientists and engineers perform
management tasks or oversee contract research, and do not perform research
themselves. Still, the internal figures are probably a better indicator of
NASA's internal research effort than the totals, and are used here for that
purpose.
The employment history is given in Figure II. (The data are given in
Appendix A. Its source is described in Appendix C.)
2.3 INVENTION DISCLOSURES
NASA employees and contractors are required to disclose potentially
significant inventions to NASA. A general ,,roblem with invention disclosure
reporting, however, is that individual technologists are subject to the
varying rules of their particular organization. In addition, there is the
inherent desire of private organizations to keep inventions secret.
c
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Figure II
NASA EMPLOYMENT OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
140
	
* * *
1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980
YEAR
Both NASA employees and contractors are required to report newly
developed technology to NASA authorities. The reports are made to the NASA
field center responsible for the work and coordinated by a technology util-
ization (TU) officer. The TU officer assigns a ca ge number to the invention
and startm a screening process which leads to decisions on whether or not a
patent application should be made and whether or not the new invention
should be announced in the NASA's Tech Brief Journal. All inventions which
enter the screening process are counted as invention disclosures.
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WInvention disclosures thus have a problem, shared with patent data,
when used as indicators of new technology: the disclosures are for inven-
tions of differing quality. It might be more accurate to use only inven-
tion which successfully pass through the screening process; for such inven-
tions, either a patent application is made or an anouncement is made in the
Tech Brief Journal. Unfortunately data on such inventions are not readily
available.
Difficulty in identifying which inventions are to be reported also
leads to problems with the disclosure series used here. Companies working
for NASA are required by their contracts to report any new technology devel-
oped. Contractors and contract managers have guidelines for reporting of
new technology. The guidelines were printed in ha,adbooks and published In
1966 and 1969. 7 The rules for reporting have not changed since then but
the NASA effort put into enforcing the rules has not necessarily been
constant. If the effort has remained constant then the invention disclo-
sure* are equivalent measures for each year since the reporting rules
were published. On the other hand, if, as seems likely, NASA's enforcement
effort has been flagging, then the more recent invention disclosures tend to
understate the technology developed.
Even NASA employees do not operate under a clear a set of invention
disclosure rules. Inventions are reported by employees and their super-
visors to Technology Utilization (TU) Officers at each field center. The
reporting takes place oecause employees are aware of the TU program and
7 These are NASA Handbook (NHB) :.470.1 and NHB 2170.3.
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because of an Incentive Awards Program. The Incentive Awards Program at
NASA rewards inventors based on the value of their invention (as determined
by an awards committee). The relationship between this program and inven-
tion reproting is not clearly defined. It is very difficult to say how
employee invention reporting has varied over time at NASA.
The invention reporting records are given in Figure III. (The associ-
ated data are given in Appendix A. Its source is described in Appendix C.)
Figure III
NASA INVENTION DISCLOSURES
YEAR
Legend :
T is Total Disclosures
E is NASA Employee Disclosures
C is Contractor Disclosures
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2.4 PATENT APPLICATIONS
The general problems with using patent applications as an indicator of
the results of R&D include: patent policies vary from organization to
organization; patents do not promote the commercialization of technology
that is not patentable; and it does not always pay to patent those new tech-
nologies which are patentable.8
At NASA, patent applications are filed for ten to twenty percent of the
inventions reported. Title to patented inventions can be obtained by NASA,
the contractor or the NASA employee inventor. NASA obtains title to all
patented inventions not wanted by their inventors. Final disposition of
title to other inventions depends on the applicability of NASA's Patent
Waiver Regulations (for contractors) and Executive Order 10096 issued by
President Nixon (for employees). 9 Only a few employee patents are not
owned by NASA while approximately half of the contractor patents remain with
the contractor.
8 These problems have been discussed in detail by many of the scholars who
have used these data before. Almost all discussions reference Jacob
Schmookler's work. His discussions are contained in his book Invention and
Economic Growth, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966; and the first
part The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, The Universities-National
Bureau Committee for Economic Research and the Committee on Economic Growth
of the Social Science Research Council, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1962, pp. 19-92. Recent work by Donald A. Dunn also discusses the
problems of patents as indicators of the advancements in some technologies:
"Information Resources and the New Information Technologies: Implications
for Public Policy", National Science Foundation report to the President and
Members of Congress, The Five Year Outlook on Science and Technology, Vci T1
pp. 493-507, May 1980.
9 It is not clear what happened to employee inventions before the Nixon
order, but since so few employees have tried to keep their inventions, the
numbers are not significant.
-11-
Other problems associated with patents as indicators of R&D output
relate to the government's decision making process for patents. Private
companies tend to acquire patents for commercial reasons; the government
does not base its decision entirely on the commercial potential of an inven-
tiol. 10 "Defensive" reasons are often mentioned to justify obtaining
patents on NASA inventions without commercial potential; this includes NASA
obtaining patents to prevent companies or foreign governments from acquiring
exclusive rights to technology it needs for various missions. Another
reason mentioned is to reward employees for work dune; an employee who makes
a useful but not commercially valuable invention is rewarded by having the
agency obtain a patent.
Since many patenting decisions are not made solely on the basis of
commercial factors, patents may not be a stable indicator of the output of
newly developed technology. In fact if we look at NASA's patent history, we
find that the number of patent applications made by NASA has remained rela-
tively constant. The number has not been nearly as volatile as invention
disclosures. As invention disclosures declined in the 70's, the percentage
of disclosures for which patent applications were made. increased. Thie
suggests that patents in the later years overstate the technology developed
by NASA compared to the earlier patents.
10 This difference has been recognized for a long time. See for example Mary
A. Holman, "The Utilization of Government Owned Inventions", Patent
Trademark and Copyright Journal of Education and Research (IDEA),
2):109-1, 1963; Donald S. Watson and Mary A. Holman, "Patents From
Government Financed Research and Development", Patent Trademark and
Copyright Journal of Education and Research, 8(2):pp. 199 ff, 1966; and
Robert A. Solo, Patent Policy for Government Sponsored Research and
Development", Patent Trademark and Copyright Journal of Education and
Research, 10:143-206, 1066.
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NASA's patent application history is given in Figure IV. (The data on
which Figure IV is based can be found in Appendix A. Its source is des-
cribed in Appendix C.)
Figure IV
NASA PATENT APPLICATIONS
1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980
YEAR
Legend:
T is Total Disclosures
E is NASA Employee Disclosures
C is Contractor Disclosures
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3. THE STATISTICAL TESTS
3.1 METHOD
The statistical method for determining whether a common lag exists is
based on Mizon, 11 who suggests sequential testing of related hypotheses.
F-	 First equation 2 is restated.
T(k) - c(o) R(k) + c(1) R(k-1) + ... + (-(m) R(k-m) + a 	 (2')
The number "m" would be a number of years after which research
effort has no effect on the technology developed in year k. The sequential
test hypothesizes arp iori a value for m which is certain to be valid, and
tries to find a smaller lag which is consistant with the observed data.
Given the formulation of Equation 3, we test the hypotheses
H(m): c(m) - 0
H(m-1): c(m) - c(m-I) - 0
H(m-2): c(m) - c(m-1) - c(m-2) - 0
Each hypothesis is tested by forming an F-ratio. When the probability
level of the test reaches a critical level (i.e. when F becomes large enough
to reject H(m-1) say), the procedure stops and the hypothesis accepted is
that the lag is I. The test proceeds backwards (from loner to shorter
lags).
11 Grayham E. Mizon, "Inferential Proceedures in Nonlinear Models: An
Application of a UK Industrial Cross Section Study of Factor Substitution
and Returns to Scale", Econometrics, 45(5):1221-1242, 1977.
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In this work, the tests are performed with an m of 5. A higher value
of m would have left very few degrees of freedom. As it is, with 21
observations on research effort and technological output, data lagged five
years allows only 16 cases to be used in the statistical calculations.
Although the tests described above are not necessarily independent, the
critical value is chosen as if this were the case. If the overall critical
value of the test is to be A the individual F tests have a critical value of
A' where
A - 1 - (1 - A')**M
or approximately, A' - A/M. The goal was to obtain overall results at a 5%
level. Hence in the case of M - 5, each individual test used a 1% critical
value.
3.2 RESULTS.
Six sets of h ,ipotheses were tested. The results are given in Appendix
B. The Appendices tables show the F statistic for the test that the last
m-1 variables are zero. (m is the maximum lag and I is the hypothesized
lag.) Also contained in these tables are the coefficients of the resulting
models, computed two ways: with and without an intercept. (In many cases
the intercept was not significantly different from zero.) The tables below
summarize the results of the Appendices. It shows the lag (R) obtained from
each specification of dependent and independent variables.
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Table of Significant Lags for m - 5
Independent	 Dependent
Variable	 Variables	 Lag
--------------------------------------------------
Total Total Outlays 1
Invention Disclosures
Total Total Outlays 1
Patent Applications
Contractor Total Outlays 1
Invention Disclosures
Contractor Total Outlays
Patent Applications
Employee Employment 0
Invention Disclosures
Employee Employment
Patent Applications
* No relationship was significant.
w;
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The lags found by this procedure vary from one to zero years. This is
shorter than Scherer's asumption of 9 to 30 months. 12 A possible
explanation for this difference is that research on government R&D projects
commences before the indicators of research effort show a change. For
example, when the government contracts with a company to do research, the
company may have done some work prior to the execution of the contract.
Further expenditures will be recorded by NASA only after they are billed for
work executed by the contractor. Also important is that a large payment may
even come at the end as with many incentive award contracts.
Thus, the time between when the money is spent and an invention is
disclosed or patent application is made may be shorter than the time between
when the contractor does the work and prepares a disclosure or patent
application. These factors suggest the the shorter lags discovered here are
not unreasonable.
The lags between employment and technological output appear to be
shorter than the lags between total outlays and technological output. A
possible explanation for this result is that employment figures are even
slower to indicate changes in research effort than spending changes. This
is not too surprising since government agencies are slow to reduce their
size as the work they do is cut back.
A potentially surprising conclusion is that the observed lag as it
relates to patent applications is shorte • than the lag as it relates to
12 Scherer, op. cit.
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invention disclosures. One would think that on the basis of government
reporting regulations and patent law, the patent application lag should be
greater than or equal to the invention disclosure lag. Government
regulations specify clearly that invention disclosures are to be made
promptly upon reduction to practice of the invention. The decision to
patent generally involves an assessment of commercial risk against known
patenting costs, and a patent application involves months of preparation.
Thus, it would be surprising to find a patent application being filed even
simultaneously with a disclosure for the same invention, were the world to
obey government regulations perfectly.
Furthermore, even if a disclosure to a government agency were to
constitute a public disclosure (which it may or may not), the firm is still
granted a one year grace period to obtain U.S. patent rights. Thus, if a
firm is only interested in U.S. patent protection, patent law removes the
incentive to patent first and disclose later.
The explanation for this unexpected result lies perhaps in the history
of judicial reaction to patent infringement cases, and in the resultant
forms of protection adopted by firms. Supreme Court and lower court
hostility to patent protection, in addition to the cost and lengthy process
of filing and protecting a patent, has led many firms to adopt "trade
secret" protection. "Trade secret" protection has been upheld under state
law, and has been adopted particularly among industries featuring rapidly
evolving technology. In these industries a particular invention could
become obsolete even prior to the issuance of the patent, so that the
incentive to patent is entirely removed.
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Since NASA hires contractors to perform research and development work
on advanced technology, it is likely that NASA contractors will find trade
secret protection advantageous. Even if their technology does not risk
obsolescence in the immediate future, the firm might evaluate the costs and
risks of patenting and protecting the patent as being in excess of the gains
derived from obtaining that patent. Trade secret protection would in either
case be preferred, and it would be to the firm's benefit to delay disclosure
as long as possible.
The lag between contract funding and either invention disclosure or
patent application is thus seen to be a function of individual perceptions
on the appropriate method of protecting particular intellectual property,
std of corporate policy. This insight may best explain the unusual results
concerning disclosure and patent lags. For those inventions that are
perceived best protected by patents, an application is filed early. For
those on which a patent is not seen advantageous, no disclosure action is
taken until the latest possible time. Note that this last result can also
occur because of a human reluctance to engage in auxiliary paperwork,
leading to procrastination in reporting activities such as invention
disclosures.
A final conclusion relates to indicators of technological output. The
sequential hypothesis testing showed that invention disclosures correlated
better to the measures of research effort used than did patent
applications. This suggests that invention disclosures are a better
indicator of technological output than patent applications. This is not
surprising since the decision to make a patent application is more complex
-19-
than the decision to make an invention disclosure. NASA's attitude
regarding patent applications has not been as consistant as its attitude
regarding invention disclosures. Moreover, most congressional interest and
policy direction hau related to patenting rather than the disclosure of
information.
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APPENDIX A
DATA FROM FIGURES IN THE TEXT
YEAR R&D EMPLOY INVENTION PATENT APPLICATIONS
OUPLAYS OF DISCLOSURES NASA OWNED EMPL CNTR
S & E NASA CNTR EMPL CNTR OWND OWND
1959 403024 92 17
1960 831132 123 it
1961 1439784 131 162
1962 2701702 212 449
1963 4701678 10965 435 759 '1 32 15 23
1964 6362569 12249 412 1203 114 83 9 25
1965 7429852 13115 382 2094 149 91 9 45
1966 7404628 13556 367 3310 112 112 10 60
1967 6423671 13956 487 3268 164 91 11 57
1968 5439636 13851 434 3551 106 163 10 48
1969 4621709 13839 535 2827 184 118 4 43
1970 3911732 13837 415 2145 142 113 4 57
1971 3547862 13227 265 2145 165 85 12 66
1972 3387050 12616 265 2304 144 72 9 55
1973 3116698 12085 279 1608 118 111 8 46
1974 2809087 11770 251 878 108 84 9 48
1975 2724077 11665 26C 1091 105 72 8 49
1976 2815187 11629 260 1152 110 93 12 31
1977 2791196 11544 260 1200 101 112 4 54
1978 2654686 11465 252 1123 75 140 2 38
1979 2659570 11284 221 1052 89 73 2 42
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Appendix B
Hypothesis Testing with m S
M,
Total Invention Disclosures by Total Outlays
(With Intercept)
Hypothesis	 F-Statistic	 Degrees of Prob < F
Years Tested Freedom
5 2.5137	 1 9 0.1473
4,5 1.6412	 2 9 0.2468
3,4,5 1.5332	 3 9 0.2718
2,3,4,5 2.9484	 4 9 0.0820
1,2,3,4,5 22.5616	 5 9 0.0001
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Intercept 203.262 169.170
0 - 3.495 E -4 9.505 E -5
1 8.177E-4 8.842E-5
(No Intercept)
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard Error
0	 - 3.051 E -4
	
8.865 E -5
1	 8.161 E -4
	
8.949 E -5
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Patet.t Applications by Total Outlays
(With Intercept)
Hypothesis F-Statistic Degrees of
Years Tested Freedom
5 0.0735 1 9
5.4 2.2586 2 9
3.4,5 3.0752 3 9
2.3.4,5 4.0751 4 9
1.2.3,4,5 10.3186 5 9
Prob < F
0.7924
0.1604
'1.0833
0,0372
0.%.;#16
Parameter	 Estimate
	
Standard Error
Intercept	 209.330
	 18.892
0	 - 3.855 E -5
	 8.41 E -6
1	 5.319 E -5
	 8.42 E -6
(No Intercept)
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard Error
0	 - 1.751 E -5	 2.473 E -•5
1	 7.493 E -5	 2.472 E -5
i
3
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iContractor Disclosures by Total Outlays
(With Intercept)
_	 Hypothesis	 F-Statistic	 Degrees of	 Prob < F
Years Tested	 Freedom
5	 4.1834	 1	 9	 0.0711
4,5
	
2.2531	 2	 9	 0.1609
t	 3,4;5	 1.6947	 3	 9	 0.2371
2,3.4,5	 2.4541	 4	 9	 0.1212
1.2.3,4,5	 18.0903	 5	 9	 0.0002
	
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard Error
	
Intercept	 75.732	 160.991
0	 - 3.690 B -5
	
9.046 E -5
1	 7.884 E -4	 8.414 E -5
(No Intercept)
	
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard Error
0	 - 3.520 E -4	 8.155 E -5
1	 7.875 E -4	 8.232 E -5
(
F
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Contractor Patent Applications by Total Outlays
(With Intercept)
Hypothesis F-Statistic Degrees of Prob < F
Years Tested Freedom
5 0.0826 1 9 0.7803
4,5 0.0671 2 9 0.9356
3,4,5 0.0504 3 9 0.9841
2,3,4,5 0.0381 4 9 0.9967
1,2,3,4,5 1.4238 5 9 0.3035
0,1,2,3,4,5 1.25 6 9 0.3676
Coefficients For A 1 Year Lag
With Intercept
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard Error
Intercept	 119.034	 15.539
0	 - 2.840 E -5	 6.914 E -6
1	 3.399 E -5	 6.924 E -6
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Employee Invention Disclosures by Employment
(With Intercept)
E,
Hypothesis F-Statistic Degrees of Prob < F
Years Tested Freedom
5 2.0602 1 9 0.2107
4,5 1.4389 2 9 0.3209
3,4,5 1.9889 3 9 0.2342
2,3,4,5 2.;550 4 9 0.1657
1,2,3,4,5 5.9982 5 9 0.0357
0,1,2,3,4,5 19.8761 6 9 0.0024
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Intercept - 419.378 231.598
0 6.070 E -2 1.845 E -2
(No Intercept)
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard Error
0	 0.0274	 1.599 E -3
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AEmployee Patent Applications by Employment
(With Intercept)
M,
Hypothesis	 F-Statistic Degrees of Prob < F
Yearn Tested Freedom
5 0.0523 1 9 0.8281
4,5 3.5463 2 9 0.1099
3,4,5 2.1060 3 9 0.1833
2,3,4,5 2.4460 4 9 0.1766
1,2,3,4,5 2.8015 5 9 0.1413
0,1,2,3,4,5 6.0781 6 9 0.0332
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Intercept -	 168.758 64.200
0 2.381 E -2 5.112 E -3
(No Intercept)
Parameter	 Estimate	 Standard Error
n	 0.01041	 4.855 E -4
Coefficients For A 1 Year Lag
With Intercept
Parameter	 Estimate
	 Standard Error
Intercept	 - 168.090
	 75.228
0	 1.697 E -2
	
1.200 E -2
1	 6.828 E -3
	
1.164 E -2
-27-
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Appendix C
Data Sources
The expenditure data originated from the yearly fiscal data reported in
the NASA Pocket Statistics of 1980. For the years before the transition
quarter, the value for calendar year X was computed as the average of fiscal
year X and X + 1. After the transition quarter, calendar year X was
computed as three-fourths of fiscal year X and one-fourth of fiscal year
X + 1. For the transition year, the amount was one-half of the fiscal year
plus the transition amount plus one-fourth of the next year's amount. The
resulting calendar year numbers were then discounted using the GNP price
deflator.
The employment data were obtained from NASA's personnel office. They
are the number of employees classified as scientists and engineers employed
at the end of each fiscal year.
The invention disclosure and patent application information came from
the yearly summary of NASA patent activities put out by the General Counsel
for Patent Matters. The summary for 1980 was in an undated memo of general
distribution circulated in mid-1981.
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